Audio read by Dr. Jeff McCausland
Excerpt written by Jeff McCausland and Tom Vossler
Confederate commander Robert E. Lee arrived on the Gettysburg battlefield around mid-afternoon of the first day of the battle. Fighting had begun west of the town in the early morning hours. He arrived in time to see his forces continuing their attacks against the enemy west and north of the town. Upon his arrival at the scene of the fighting, Lee was initially disturbed that the fighting had been started by his subordinate commanders at a time and place not of his choosing.
However, as he studied the terrain and positions of the opposing forces, he realized his forces had taken the initiative and had gained the momentum necessary for victory. All that was necessary for his forces to seize the dominant high ground immediately south of the town and achieve the victory was to continue to pursue the enemy and force them in further retreat.
Portrait of Lieutenant General Richard Ewell
Photo: USAMHI
During the early afternoon hours of July 1st, Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s attacking infantry and artillery had pushed back the enemy line of battle from positions north of the town and into the town itself. Ewell’s troops were now in the best position to continue the attack through the town to seize the high ground immediately south of it.
Accordingly, as he had done in previous battles and as was his leadership style, Lee sent a brief verbal order to Ewell via a staff officer to continue the attack through the town and seize the key high ground. However, Lee added one qualifier to the order. Ewell was to make the attack only if he found it “practical to do so”.
Lee’s use of a “discretionary order” is consistent with his leadership style. He had always preferred to provide his subordinates broad guidance, which is often referred to as “mission command” by military commanders and can be used by the leader of any organization. The leader who follows this concept gives general direction to his subordinates consistent with the organization’s stated mission and vision. Subordinate leaders are expected to operate within the guidance, but it allows them significant discretion and is designed to encourage initiative.
LEADERSHIP STYLE
Lee discussed his leadership style with Captain Justus Scheibert on the afternoon of July 2. Scheibert was a Prussian officer who along with several other European officers was an observer with the Confederate army during the campaign. Lee observed, “My interference in battle would do more harm than good. I have, then, to rely on my brigade and division commanders. I think and work with all my powers to bring my troops to the right place at the right time, then I have done my duty. As soon as I order them into battle, I leave my army in the hands of God.”[i]
This “mission command” style had worked for Lee since assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia in June 1862, but by the summer of 1863 that may have no longer been true. When he assumed command of the Rebel army Lee had been blessed with both outstanding and experienced subordinate leaders in Stuart, Jackson, and Longstreet, as well as a great deal of good fortune. Up until this moment Lee had been clearly superior to the Union commanders he had confronted.
Richard Ewell had been a good if not outstanding divisional commander but had experienced a far different relationship with his previous boss, General Stonewall Jackson. If Lee’s style of leadership emphasized “mission command,” Jackson’s style was “watch my lips.” He issued very explicit orders to his subordinates on what he required their units to do, how he wanted it done, and when he desired it accomplished. Jackson allowed little to no room for initiative or creativity, and he further expected his subordinates to seek additional guidance when the task was completed. Some have suggested that Jackson was conscious of the moral of his command. He firmly believed that nothing ever fully excused failure, and it was very rare that he gave an officer a second chance. “The service,” he said, “cannot afford to keep a man who does not succeed.” Consequently, he never felt restrained from changing leaders for fear that it would make things worse. His motto was “get rid of the unsuccessful man at once, and trust Providence for finding a better.”[ii]
Clearly, Jackson’s leadership style did not create a climate of initiative throughout the corps he commanded. He was reported to have placed officers under court-martial charges for withdrawing from the field when their units were out of ammunition. He even relieved an officer who allowed his troops to burn fence rails when his unit was encamped on property that the officer owned.[iii] Jackson had ordered that private property not be appropriated, and despite his generosity, the officer was suspended from duty on the charge of giving away his own property! On that fateful afternoon General Richard Ewell was newly in command of a corps and a lonely, conflicted figure.
Each leader must determine an individual leadership style that is appropriate for them. In many ways our leadership style exists on a continuum that stretches from broad guidance to direct command. This is based on a leader’s individual “comfort level,” their willingness to accept risk, and how experienced their subordinate leaders are. Effective leaders must also adjust their style as conditions change. If an organization is experiencing an existential crisis or has undergone a significant change in mid-level leadership, then a leader might likely assume more direct control over decisions. Still, every leader should be able to adjust their style based on the overall competency, confidence, and experience of the leaders who work for them.
Many historians have held General Ewell accountable for this decision, which they contend set the stage for the eventual Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. This is unfair in many ways or at a minimum incomplete analysis. Still the events during the afternoon of July 1, 1863, raise several interesting leadership questions. When Lee sent Major Taylor with the so-called “discretionary order” to Ewell was he really communicating with Richard Ewell, a new corps commander in the middle of his first major engagement? Or was he perhaps still communicating with the now dead General Stonewall Jackson, who Lee knew would do what he desired and continue the attack? Following Jackson’s death, Lee lamented to one of his officers, “I had such implicit confidence in Jackson’s skill and energy that I never troubled myself to give him detailed instructions. The most general instructions were all that were needed.”[iv]
The need for a leader to adjust his or her leadership style can also be seen in contemporary examples. General David Petraeus is a widely respected and experienced twenty-first century military leader who commanded the 101st Airmobile Division during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. He maintained close control of the deployment of his brigades during the invasion, but this was during a conventional war. The goal was to destroy Iraqi ground forces and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Petraeus returned to Iraq in 2007 as commander of all coalition military forces in the country. This was during “the surge” that resulted in a significant increase in the overall level of troops deployed. He altered his previous leadership style and adopted a broad use of “mission command.” Petraeus knew the situation had changed dramatically. Rather than engaging the Iraqi army and measuring success based on the capture of enemy territory, his troops were now facing terrorists and insurgents. They had to be deployed in small units throughout Baghdad to secure the city and provide reassurance to the population. A new environment demanded a change in leadership style.
[i] Justus Scheibert, Seven Months in the Rebel States (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1958), 14. See also Jeffrey D. Wert, A Glorious Army (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 256; and Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg—and Why It Failed (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons), 183.
[ii] G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988), 36, 601–602, 614.
[iii] Henderson, 193, 150.
[iv] Freeman, R. E. Lee,1.
Parts of this article are excerpted and adapted from Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st Century Leaders written by Jeffrey D. McCausland and Tom Vossler. Book is available now! Order your copy at: https://bit.ly/battletestedbook.