Most Americans don’t know much about the American Revolution. All most of us remember from school is “taxation without representation”, dumping tea into Boston Harbor, and the minutemen on Lexington green. A few more learned about Valley Forge, a guy named von Steuben who trained troops there, and the final victory at Yorktown.
My new book, The Armstrong Brothers,[1] reveals how independence was wrested from Great Britain because a small group of patriots not only took up arms at the outset, but were willing to endure eight years of a grueling war that frequently hung in the balance. Their harrowing struggle is seen through the eyes of three young Pennsylvania farmers whose experiences encompassed nearly the totality of the Revolution.
Can useful lessons to be learned from a war fought two centuries ago? I submit the answer is a resounding Yes! There are too many to explore in one short article, but Chapter 11 which covers the 1781 southern campaign illustrates a few.
First, a little background to set the stage…
The Revolution’s lowest point was early 1781. The previous year saw the capture of Charleston, a humiliating defeat at Camden, Benedict Arnold’s treason, and two major mutinies in the Continental Army. Britain completely controlled Georgia and the Carolinas while Washington struggled merely to keep his army from dissolving. To redeem the disasters in the southern states, all he could do was send a new commander and a handful of Continental troops. Could Gen. Nathanael Green even manage to survive much less defeat the overwhelming forces arrayed against him?
Let’s take a close look at some strategic miscalculations…
A persistent unfounded belief by British officials in London was that colonists loyal to the crown greatly outnumbered those wanting independence. After capturing Charleston, the British commander, Clinton, issued two proclamations, one pardoning rebels willing to swear allegiance to the King and a second requiring them to take up arms if called upon to support British interests. This made neutrality impossible and gave permission to loyalists to take revenge on their patriot neighbors. Exacerbating this situation was the casual brutality with which occupying British troops treated patriots and loyalists alike. These actions were the two biggest blunders of the southern campaign, and both backfired almost immediately. Militia leaders who had previously fought the British but had since opted out of the war, saw no other option but resistance. Within six weeks, patriot bands in the Carolinas fought 15 engagements inflicting heavy losses on British forces in a deadly war of attrition. The culminating point was the Battle of King’s Mountain in October 1780 where a patriot force annihilated a British-led loyalist militia force. At the cost of 96 patriots killed or wounded, the loyalists suffered 300 killed or wounded and 700 prisoners. Loyalists throughout the Carolinas now became reluctant to support the crown.
Greene’s Dilemma—and the Solution
Nathanael Greene arrived in South Carolina to find a demoralized army in shambles. To Washington, he wrote, “The wants of this army are so numerous and various that the shorter way of telling you is to inform you that we have nothing.” His entire Continental Army force consisted of 90 cavalry, 60 artillery, and 2,307 infantry with only 1,482 fit for duty.
After a careful analysis, he elected to avoid a direct fight with Clinton’s successor, Cornwallis, and use his small force to bolster the efforts of patriot militias until the army was rebuilt and the British were reduced by attrition to a point where he could risk a conventional battle. He also divided his already small force in the face of a superior enemy. Greene knew he was violating the most basic rule of warfare, but he also knew this would make it easier for both parts to subsist and would complicate British decision-making. He also knew that the two widely separated forces could not be defeated because of their superior mobility compared to the baggage-laden British.
Cornwallis erred by dispatching too small a force to deal with the force led by Daniel Morgan. Instead of going after him with his entire army while Greene was rebuilding, he sent an impetuous young cavalryman, Banastre Tarleton, with only 1,100 men. At a place known as the Cowpens the crafty Morgan fought and won the tactical masterpiece of the entire war. At a cost of 12 Americans killed and 60 wounded, Tarleton lost 100 men killed including 39 officers, 229 wounded, and 600 captured. Greene could now risk confronting Cornwallis directly.
The two fought at Guildford Courthouse where Cornwallis won a Pyrrhic victory. More than a quarter of his already depleted force were killed or wounded, and he had to march back to the coast and the safety of the Royal Navy. When the loyalist population in the Carolinas failed to rally to him, he decided to head for Virginia and a rendezvous with destiny at a village named Yorktown.
Abandoned by their commander, remaining British outposts in the Carolinas were picked off like ripe apples by Greene until by the end of 1781 Britain controlled only three southern ports: Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah. Defeat had been turned into victory in ten months.
Leadership Lessons for Our Time
Britain based its southern strategy on the flawed assumption that the colonial population in the Carolinas and Georgia mostly supported the King. This was wrong, and the error was compounded by local commanders whose policies and brutality drove patriots, loyalists, and fence sitters alike into direct opposition or an unwillingness to support British forces in the field.
Greene, on the other hand, carefully assessed his options and chose a strategy that maximized the opportunities for success while minimizing the possibility of failure. Because of a mostly supportive patriot population, he could easily live off the land, move without risk, and strike at times and places of his own choosing. Although he never won a major battle, he impaired the forces of Cornwallis and other British commanders so heavily they had no option but to abandon the entire area of operations.
Does any of this sound familiar?
Does it remind you of Vietnam? Afghanistan? Both wars were waged on false assumptions about the population and an ignorance of local culture. Americans won every battle, but lost to inferior opponents who had local support in a population that suffered enormously from the collateral damage caused by American air, artillery, and drone strikes. And all the while we buttressed unpopular governments that had lost popular support and were completely alienated from the very people they purported to represent. Little wonder they were eventually repudiated by their own troops who refused to fight for them.
These lessons apply to every field of endeavor. No project succeeds if its underlying strategy is based on false premises or wishful thinking, if executives ignore the impact of poor customer service, or if a business model requires resources not obtainable or not yet available.
So yes, the lessons of the American Revolution are as relevant in the 21st century as in the 18th.
Learn more American Revolution leadership lessons in my book at this website: https://www.thearmstrongbrothers.com/
——————————————————————————————
[1] David O. Smith, The Armstrong Brothers: One Pennsylvania Family's Contributions to Victory in the American Revolution, (Bloomington IN: Xlibris, 2021).
Image Source: http://www.nathanaelgreenehomestead.org/#